THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
IN SHAPING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ARTHUR FRAAS*

INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, the environment has become a major concern
for all developed nations. An increasing amount of national resources is
being expended to address environmental problems. Many environmental
initiatives take the form of government regulation of the private activities of
manufacturers and consumers. By controlling the emissions to air and water,
requiring the safe disposal of wastes, and banning the use of certain
substances and products, regulations can yield substantial environmental and
health benefits.
Unfortunately, the regulatory actions needed to create these
environmental benefits often impose substantial costs. In a typical year, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") publishes several major proposed
or final regulations, each of which will impose net annual economic costs
ranging from half a billion to well over a billion dollars. In addition to the
substantial direct costs of these rules, they may also have unintended effects
that interfere with other social goals. For example, the adoption of more
stringent automobile fuel economy standards will likely have adverse effects
on automobile safety. Therefore, it is important to consider all the effects of
proposed initiatives before imposing regulations. This will insure that
regulatory actions achieve their intended objectives effectively and efficiently.
This article sets out the recent United States experience in using economic
analysis to develop environmental policy. The article first outlines the role
provided for economic analysis in shaping regulations under the
environmental statutes of the United States. It then discusses the analytical
requirements of Executive Order 12291.' Finally, the article discusses two
Copyright © 1991 by Law and Contemporary Problems
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I. Executive Order 12291, signed by President Reagan in January 1981, represents the
cornerstone of current executive oversight of federal regulatory activity. The Executive Order
requires that federal agencies submit proposed and final rules to the OIRA (within OMB) for review
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cases in which economic analysis proved important and summarizes EPA's
experience with the use of economic analysis in shaping environmental policy.
II
THE ROLE OF ANALYSIS UNDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES

All three branches of the federal government figure prominently in
shaping environmental policy. First, Congress enacts the basic environmental
statutes. Then, the executive branch, through EPA, interprets the general
statutory language and establishes specific requirements for state and local
government, industry, and individual households. After EPA promulgates
regulations, interested parties may challenge its interpretation of the statute
in the courts. Such challenges may succeed where EPA's action is contrary to

specific statutory language or where it has made procedural errors. Typically,
though, the courts give broad deference to agency rulemaking.
There is no formal role for economic analysis in developing new
legislation, although interested parties often present analytical studies
addressing specific issues of concern during the course of developing
legislation. In addition, Congress may require EPA to conduct an economic
analysis as a part of its rulemaking process, and it may also prohibit the
consideration of certain kinds of analysis. Thus, EPA's discretion to use
economic analysis as a basis for decisionmaking varies considerably across
statutes, and even within statutes. The specific federal environmental statute
in question determines the extent to which economic analysis contributes to
EPA's interpretation.
In some cases, EPA has substantial latitude to use benefit/ cost (or "costeffectiveness") analysis in a variety of important programs under each of the
environmental statutes. (See Table I) For example, the Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act provisions establishing "technology-based" standards to
limit emissions from major industrial sources allow the consideration of a
variety of factors, including the costs and cost-effectiveness of alternative
requirements. 2 In addition, the "unreasonable risk" language contained in
key provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act

("FIFRA") and the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") explicitly adopts
prior to their publication in the Federal Register. Under Executive Order 12291 federal agencies
are, to the extent permitted by law, to undertake regulatory action only if (1) there is adequate
information concerning the need for and consequences of the proposed action and (2) the proposed
action maximizes net benefits to society. 3 CFR § 103 (1982).
2. These include New Source Performance Standards under section I I I of the Clean Air Act,
Publ L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1683 (1970), now codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 7407, 7411 (1988)
and the effluent guideline requirements under sections 301, 304, and 307 of the Clean Water Act,
Publ L 92-500, 86 Stat 816 (1972), now codified at 33 USC §§ 1311, 1314, 1317. For a further
discussion of the use of a "cost-effectiveness" criterion in setting technology-based limits under the
Clean Water Act, see Arthur Fraas & V. G. Munley, Economic Objectives within a Bureaucratic Decision
Process: Setting Pollution Control Requirements under the Clean Water Act, J Envir Econ & Mgmt 17, 35-53
(1989).
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a benefit/cost framework as a basis for decisionmaking. 3 Where EPA has this
flexibility, economic analysis can play an important role in setting regulatory
policy. Statutory provisions directed at the protection of public health,
however, often restrict EPA's discretion in using such analysis. For example,
the Clean Air Act requires that EPA establish primary National Ambient Air
Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for the "criteria" pollutants so that they
protect public health with an adequate margin of safety. 4 EPA has interpreted
this provision as requiring that the primary NAAQS are to be set solely on the
basis of the effects of these pollutants on health. Other factors, such as the
feasibility or cost of achieving these standards, cannot be considered. 5 This
6
interpretation was upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Over the last decade, Congress and the courts have acted to limit federal
regulators' discretion and the use of economic analysis in making regulatory
decisions addressing public health. In 1986, Congress amended the Safe
Drinking Water Act by replacing the original language that allowed the
consideration of benefits and costs in setting the maximum contaminant levels
("MCLs") for drinking water. Under the 1986 amendments, EPA must set
MCLs based on the best available control technology that is "feasible." 7 As a
part of this new statutory language, Congress specifically defined granular
activated carbon as the best available feasible technology for controlling
organic contaminants, ending a long-standing debate about requiring such
technology based on benefit/cost considerations.
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments further limit the role of benefit/cost
analysis in regulating emissions of air toxics.8 Title III of the 1990
amendments requires EPA to establish air toxic standards that represent the
''maximum degree of reduction in emissions ... taking into consideration the
cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and
environmental impacts and energy requirements . . ." The amendments to
3. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 USC § 136(bb) (1988) Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 USC § 2605(c) (1988).
4. Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7408.
5. Roger W. Findley & Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Law in a Nutshell 75 (West 1988).
6. Lead Industries Association, Inc. v EPA, 647 F2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980).
7. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 USC § 300g-l(b)(5) (1988).
8. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399 (1990). In a 1987
decision, the D.C. Circuit interpreted the Clean Air Act provision limiting emissions of hazardous air
pollutants as establishing a two-step regulatory process. As a first step, EPA was to determine
whether existing emission levels were "safe." The court explicitly stated that "safe" does not mean
"risk-free." If levels were not "safe," then EPA was to set emission standards that were "safe." As a
second step, EPA was to determine whether a more stringent emission standard was appropriate,
taking into account such factors as the feasibility of achieving these more stringent standards, the
likely additional reduction in risks, and the costs of achieving this reduction. NRDC v United States
EPA, 824 F2d 1146 (DC Cir 1987) (en banc). EPA implemented this decision in setting standards for
benzene and radionucleide sources by adopting as a presumptive goal (reflecting a safe level of
emissions) an individual lifetime risk to the most exposed individual of one in 10,000. As a practical
matter, since most industrial facilities pose maximum individual risks that are less than one in 10,000,
EPA standard-setting for air toxics under the 1987 decision would have allowed consideration of a
wide variety of factors, including benefits and cost.
9. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments § 301, 104 Stat at 2399, amending § 112(d)(2) of the
Clean Air Act.
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section 112(d)(3) of the original act sharply limit the discretion available
under this provision by requiring that standards for new and existing sources
be at least as stringent as the average performance for the best 12 percent of
the existing sources. Section 112(f), as amended, envisions much more
radical standard-setting. The amended section requires the EPA
administrator to report to Congress any remaining air pollution-related
health hazards by 1996. If Congress does not act on any of the
administrator's recommendations, the administrator is to formulate new rules
ensuring "an ample margin of safety to protect public health."10 Specifically,
if the standards enacted under the initial phase of the 1990 amendments do
not reduce the cancer risk to the most exposed individual from a given
category to below one in one million, the administrator is to promulgate new
standards for that category." This presumptive health goal would require
emission reductions to achieve a risk level that is two orders of magnitude
lower than the risk levels allowable under EPA's 1989 interpretation of NRDC
v United States EPA. 12
III
THE ROLE OF ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER

12291

Federal regulation has emerged as such an important and expensive part
of federal activity that each of the last five presidents has established
programs to review federal regulatory initiatives. The current program is
based on Executive Order 12291, issued by President Reagan in February
1981.13 Under Executive Order 12291, federal agencies like EPA must show

that (1) there is adequate information concerning the need for and
consequences of the proposed action, and (2) to the extent permitted by law,
the proposed action will maximize net benefits to society as compared to all
available alternatives. 14
For "major" rules, Executive Order 12291 also requires agencies to
prepare a formal economic analysis-called a Regulatory Impact Analysis
("RIA")-of its selected action and reasonably available alternatives. Major
rules are defined as rules with benefits or costs in excess of $100 million per
year; a major increase in costs or prices for a particular sector, industry, or
region of the economy; or significant adverse effects on competition,
investment, productivity, or the ability of U.S.-based firms to compete in
international markets. 15 Executive Order 12291 requires that RIAs contain:
(1) a description of the potential benefits of the rule, with a
discussion of any benefits that cannot be quantified in monetary
terms;
10.

Id (amending § 112(n).

11.

Id.

12.
13.
14.

824 F2d 1146.
3 CFR § 127 (1982).
Id at § 128.

15. Id at § 127.
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(2) a description of the potential costs of the rule, with a discussion
of any adverse effects that cannot be quantified in monetary
terms; and
(3) a description of alternative approaches that could achieve
substantially the same goal at lower cost, with an analysis of the
6
benefits and costs of such approaches.'
The primary purpose of the RIA is to provide decisionmakers with the best
information available on the likely effects of a major rule. The RIA also
provides the public, Congress, and the courts with a better understanding of
the basis for agency decisionmaking.
The current Executive Order represents a major change in the role of
analysis in developing environmental policy by shifting the focus from cost
and "affordability" to a benefit/cost criterion. Prior to 1981, EPA prepared
only a cost analysis when developing major rules. Executive Order 12291
requires an analysis of the benefits of alternative regulatory action as well.
Finally, Executive Order 12291 provides for oversight by the Executive
Office of the President by requiring federal agencies to submit all proposed
and final rules, including major rules and their associated RIAs, to the Office
of Management and Budget ("OMB") before they are published in the
Federal Register. 17 OMB then has the dual responsibility of (1) ensuring that
draft rules are consistent with the basic principles and policy objectives of the
federal government and (2) providing a measure of quality control on the
RIAs prepared by the regulatory agencies. 8 To meet this second
responsibility, OMB can request additional analysis or the development of
estimates for an alternative approach. OMB can even return a rule to its
originating agency if the RIA has not been completed or appears to be
seriously deficient.' 9 As a practical matter, though, the return of a major rule
because of an inadequate RIA rarely occurs.
EPA published an increasing number of proposed and final major rules
during the 1980s. In the early years of the Reagan Administration, EPA
published only three to five major proposed and final rules per year. In the
last two years of the Reagan Administration, EPA published roughly twenty
proposed and final major rules a year. The present value costs of the rules
published each year also increased substantially over the Reagan years. (See
Table 2)
EPA prepared RIAs for roughly 80 percent of these rules. In those cases
where EPA failed to prepare an RIA, five rules were submitted to OMB under
court-ordered deadlines; an additional five rules were either withdrawn by
16. Id at § 129.
17. Id at §§ 128-29.
18. Id at § 131.
19. In 1990, for example, OIRA returned EPA's proposed rule setting effluent limits for
discharges of water from offshore oil and gas production because of the inadequacy of the
supporting analysis. Letter to EPA Administrator William K. Reilly from Acting OIRA Administrator
James B. MacRae, Jr., Nov 16, 1990 (On file in OIRA docket library).
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TABLE

2

SUMMARY OF ACTION ON MAJOR

EPA

RULES,

1981-1990

1981
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Review Concluded
0
0
1
0
0
0
8
7
within Court Deadline
Withdrawn
0
1
1
2
1
0
1
2
Returned
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Suspended
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Conclusion of Review as
3
4
3
6
11
6
12
6
Consistent with
Executive Order
Total Major Rules
3
5
5
8
12
6
21
18
Present Value Cost of
Not
2
2
None
18
2
20
84
Major Final Rules
available
(Billion 1988 $)
Source: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs records (on file with author).
TABLE

EPA MAJOR RULES

1989
6
1
0
1
4

12
6

3

AND REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS

1981-1990

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Total
Rules with RIA
1
5
5
8
12
4
18
12
9
74
Rules without RIA
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
6
3
14
Total Major Rules
Received'
3
5
5
8
12
6
21
18
12
90
Source: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs records (on file with author).
There is no record concerning whether RIAs were submitted with two major rules in 1981.

EPA or returned to EPA for reconsideration by OMB. 20 Even where EPA did
not prepare a formal RIA, it often developed an analysis of the costs (and in
some cases the benefits) for the draft rule.
The RIAs prepared by EPA focused on developing a benefit/cost analysis
of the selected regulatory requirements and reasonable alternatives. 2 ' In
some cases, the RIAs considered additional issues critical to the design of
effective regulations, such as the appropriate level of government intervention
(federal versus state or local action) and the nature of the intervention (for
example, technology-specific requirements versus performance standards or
other economic incentive approaches that allow plant operators greater
discretion in determining the best means of complying with the standard).
The quality of the RIAs prepared by EPA has been decidedly mixed. In
some important cases, economic analysis has shaped environmental
regulation. Often, though, the RIAs have been inadequate to support critical
regulatory decisions. For example, some RIAs have given only a qualitative
statement of the likely benefits of the selected option, without any quantitative
20. No explanation for EPA's failure to provide RIAs for four other rules is available.
21. EPA's RIAs have typically given only brief attention, though, to whether government
intervention is needed because environmental problems arise from market failure.
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estimate pf the benefits for comparison to the expected costs of the proposed
regulatory action. Where benefits have been quantified, the large range in the
projected benefits and the qualifications surrounding these estimates have
22
often made it difficult to use the results in making policy decisions.
The inconsistent quality of EPA's RIAs and the failure of EPA to prepare
RIAs for some major rules reflect, in part, an increasing pressure on EPA to
proceed with rulemaking under very stringent statutory and judicial
deadlines. These deadlines often do not permit the development of a
regulatory analysis adequate to support the rule. However, when economic
analysis has been done correctly, and in detail, it has greatly aided in shaping
environmental regulations. The discussion below outlines two cases that
demonstrate this.
IV
CASE STUDIES

A.

Phasedown of Lead in Gasoline

EPA has regulated lead in gasoline since 1973. The 1973 regulation was
motivated primarily by the need to assure the availability of unleaded gasoline
for cars equipped with catalytic converters. In 1974, EPA required new cars
and light duty trucks to have catalytic converters to meet the Clean Air Act
emission standards. 2 3 Leaded gasoline poisons the catalyst, making the
catalytic converter ineffective in controlling hydrocarbon and carbon
monoxide emissions. Furthermore, in order to reduce population exposure
24
to lead, EPA established a limit on the total lead used in gasoline.
In 1981, under a new administration, EPA began a review of the limits on
lead in gasoline. This review was motivated by claims from the refining
industry that these limits imposed substantial costs on the industry (estimated
to be as high as $1 billion per year). While undertaking this review and
developing the associated RIA, however, EPA was able to show a strong
correlation between the decline in the use of lead in gasoline during the late
1970s and the decline in blood-lead levels for urban populations.2 5 As a
result, EPA promulgated new rules in 1982 to limit the amount of lead used in
leaded gasoline rather than relaxing the limits, as the refining industry had
hoped. 26 Still, the allowable level of lead in gasoline remained relatively
high-l.1 grams per leaded gallon.
This health evidence also led to an extensive review of the benefits of
further reductions in lead use; the resulting analysis showed that a substantial
22. Even incomplete RIAs, though, often provide substantial information and a more systematic
basis for evaluating regulatory alternatives.
23. 40 CFR § 85 (1974), promulgated in accordance with the Clean Air Act § 6(a), 84 Stat at
1691 (1970), codified at 42 USC § 7521 (1988).
24. 40 CFR § 80.20 (1974).
25. Costs and Benefits of Reducing Lead in Gasoline: Final Regulatory Impact Analysis 120
(EPA, 1985) ("Final Lead RIA").
26. 40 CFR § 80.20 (1983).
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further reduction in lead levels in gasoline would yield substantial net social
benefits. (See Table 4) These benefits were associated with three separate
benefit categories. First, the RIA identified substantial health benefitsreduced medical and compensatory education costs-resulting from a
reduction in blood-lead levels of inner-city children. 2 7 Second, EPA
determined that reducing the lead content of leaded gasoline would make it
more expensive, cutting down the incidence of misfueling and the associated
poisoning of automobile catalytic converters. 28 The RIA estimated indirect
benefits of $1.1 billion (present value) from the decrease in hydrocarbon and
nitrogen oxide emissions from cars and trucks. Finally, the RIA found that
reducing lead in gasoline would yield a substantial reduction in operating and
maintenance costs for cars and trucks. 29 The estimated aggregate benefits of
$8.5 billion (present value) from a phasedown of lead in gasoline substantially
exceeded the estimated social costs of $2.6 billion (present value).
TABLE

4

PRESENT VALUE OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FINAL RULE FOR
PHASEDOWN OF LEAD IN GASOLINE,
(IN MILLIONS OF

1983

1985-1992

DOLLARS)

Monetized Benefits

Children's health effects

2,500

Conventional pollutants, partial
reduction in misfueling
Maintenance
Fuel economy

1,100
4,100
800

Total Monetized Benefits
Total Refining Costs

8,500
2,600

Net Benefits

5,900

Source:

EPA, Costs and Benefits of Reducing Lead in Gasoline:
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis VIII 26 (Table VIII 8)
(1985).

As a part of its RIA, EPA also examined a variety of alternative
approaches, including the continued use of marketable permits, the banking
of credits, and pollution charges. EPA's analysis showed that the extension of
the marketable permits program begun in 1982 would offer only small
benefits under the more stringent proposed rule, 3° but a program that
allowed refiners to "bank" lead emission credits could yield roughly $200
million in cost savings. 3 ' At the same time, a banking program would provide
27. Final Lead RIA IV47-53 (cited in note 25).
28. Id at VII.
29. Id at VII 17.
30. Id at 120.
31. Id at 1I65. Refiners could generate the "banked" credits by reducing lead in their gasoline
ahead of the scheduled phasedown. These credits could be used at the end of the phasedown period
to "cushion" the stringent final lead limit of 0.1 grams per leaded gallon. Although the pattern of
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refiners with a measure of insurance against unforeseen events. On the basis
of this analysis, EPA adopted a banking program as a part of its final rule.3 2
In summary, EPA revised its rules in two steps. The initial rule capped
lead in leaded gasoline at 1.1 grams per gallon in 1982. Based on the results
of the completed analysis, a second rule, promulgated in 1985, required a
s
further sharp reduction to 0.1 grams per leaded gallon by January 1, 1986. 3
Thus the information developed as a part of EPA's regulatory analysis
resulted in a reversal of EPA's original intention-EPA decided to tighten
rather than relax restrictions on gasoline lead content.
B.

EPA's Ban/Phaseout of Asbestos

In 1984, EPA developed draft proposed rules that would have banned five
asbestos-containing products at the end of one year and phased out the use of
asbestos in all remaining products over a ten-year period. EPA's supporting
draft RIA suggested substantial net benefits from a total ban/phaseout, but
34
this analysis was initially based only on an analysis of groups of products.
EPA's revised analysis, done on a product-by-product basis, suggested that
the costs and benefits of a ban/phaseout varied widely across individual
products depending on the availability of substitutes and the use of the
asbestos product. 3 5 While a ban/phaseout for some asbestos products
appeared to yield cost-effective reductions in risk, a ban of other product
categories would have yielded estimated costs in excess of $100 million per
statistical cancer avoided.3 6 As a result, this proposal raised as a critical issue
the appropriateness of a complete phaseout of the use of asbestos.
Over the next few years, EPA substantially revised the estimated health
benefits and costs of a ban/phaseout, but a substantial variation in health
benefits and costs across product categories remained. (See Table 5) EPA's
data suggested that the ban/phaseout of a subset of product categories would
achieve most of the benefits at a fraction of the cost of a complete
ban/phaseout.
On the basis of this analysis, EPA promulgated a final rule in 1989 phasing
out asbestos use in twenty-seven product categories over a seven-year
period. 3 7 The phaseout is to occur in three stages: the ban on the first group
lead usage over the phasedown period might be somewhat different under a banking program, total
lead usage over the phasedown period would remain the same. Id at 1160-61.
32. Id.
33. 40 CFR § 80.20 (1986).
34. Preliminary Regulatory Impact and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Proposed
Revisions to the Standard for Regulating Occupational Exposure to Asbestos V29-54 (EPA, 1984).
35. Final Regulatory Impact and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Revised Asbestos
Standard, Parts V & VI (EPA, 1986) ("Final Asbestos RIA").
36. EPA estimated that costs of the ban would range from roughly $60,000 per cancer avoided
with a ban of asbestos cloth to over $650 million for the one statistical cancer avoided with the
phaseout of asbestos brake blocks. There was almost no additional reduction in cancer risk with the
ban/phaseout of nine additional small product categories. However, a phaseout of these categories
would have imposed net social costs of roughly $150 million. Final Asbestos RIA VI (cited in note
35).
37. 40 CFR § 763.160-703.179 (1990).
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TABLE 5

PRESENT VALUE OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE BAN/PHASEDOWN
OF ASBESTOS USE IN PRODUCTS, 1987-2000
Major Categories Subject to
Ban /Phasedown

Total
Cancers
Avoided

Benefits with
Continued Use
(Present Value)'

Cost per Statistical
Cancer Avoided 2
(Millions $/Case)

Beater/A Gaskets
Roofing Felt
Sheet Gaskets
Roof Coatings

21.0
1.2
11.0
1.1

110.0
7.3
97.0
45.0

5.2
6.1
8.8
40.0

A/C Pipe
A/C Sheet
A/C Shingles
Drum Brake Linings
Drum After Market
Disc Brake Pads
Disc Aftermarket
Brake Blocks

2.1
0.9
0.2
6.3
77.0
0.9
12.0
7.3

128.0
2.4
24.0
7.1
8.8
3.9
3.9
2.0

61.0
2.7
120.0
1.1
0.1
4.3
0.3
0.3

Major
Exempted Categories
Asbestos Diaphragms
0.3
>2000
>6000
Hi-Grade Electrical Tape
0.4
>50
> 125
Missile Liners
0.4
2000
6000
Reinforced Plastic
0.4
35
90
Sealant Tape
<0.1
35
350
Special Industrial Gaskets
6.6
95
15
Source: EPA, Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce
Prohibitions, 54 Fed Reg 29460, 29460-29507 (1989).
In millions of dollars. Discounted at 3% from time of exposure; EPA did not discount over the
latency period.
2 Discounted at 3%; costs based on 1987
dollars.

of products begins in August 1990; a ban for a second group in 1993; and a
ban for the final group in 1996.38 At the same time, EPA exempted ten
product categories from the phaseout. The product categories exempted
represent a set of highly-valued uses in industrial, space, and military
applications where the development of suitable substitutes remains uncertain.
Together, the exempted categories represent roughly 5 percent of current
asbestos use in the United States. EPA estimated that the continued use of
asbestos in these product categories would result in only a small increase in
cancer risks, while the costs of a ban would be at least several billion dollars. 39
Using EPA's estimates, this approach achieves a 95 percent reduction in the
cancer incidence associated with the use of asbestos in products at only 10
percent of the cost of a total ban/phaseout.

38. 40 CFR § 763.165.
39. The health risks associated with these exempted uses appear to be quite small because (1)
the volume of asbestos used in these products is very small, (2) uses are limited to industrial and
military applications so that exposures over product lifecycle are limited, and (3) continuing OSHA
regulation will further limit occupational exposure.
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Caveat Emptor

Despite the thoroughness of these two RIAs, there were still important
flaws in the analyses. In the lead phasedown case, important cost and benefit
categories were not quantified. EPA based its health-benefit estimates of
reducing blood-lead levels solely on the cost of remedial health and education
care for children with elevated levels; there may be additional health benefit
categories to be considered. 40 On the other hand, EPA may have overstated
actual benefits from some benefit categories. For example, EPA estimated
that the reduction in operation and maintenance costs with lead phasedown
substantially exceeded the expected refining cost. There is little evidence
from the private market to support these estimates. Certainly, if the net
benefit accruing to vehicle owners from using unleaded gas were as large as
projected by EPA, we would have expected to see drivers shifting from leaded
to unleaded gasoline as soon as unleaded gasoline was offered in the mid41
1970s.
In its decision regarding asbestos products, EPA argued that its analysis
did not estimate accurately the increase in actual exposure to the general
population from continued asbestos use.4 2 EPA also argued that the RIA
overstated the costs of a ban/phasedown because it made conservative
assumptions about the cost of substitutes. 43 EPA did not acknowledge,
though, that other assumptions in its analysis probably overstated actual
health risks. For example, EPA's analysis did not reflect the continuing
controversy over the relative potency of different types of asbestos or the
44
substantial latency period for asbestos-caused cancer.
Finally, these RIAs were not blueprints for EPA regulatory action. EPA's
actual regulatory decision reflected policy goals that deviated from the most
efficient policy choices identified by zhe regulatory analysis. In the case of
asbestos, EPA's regulatory strategy appears to have been directed toward
eliminating the use of asbestos in products in general commerce, while
exempting certain critical industrial and military applications of asbestos. As
a result, EPA adopted a ban/phasedown of some general commerce product
40. In its final RIA, for example, EPA also reported a possible relationship between lead
exposure and blood pressure. On the basis of this potential relationship, EPA calculated very large
additional benefits-$38 billion (present value)-associated with the estimated reduction in heart
disease and strokes linked with the decline in blood pressure with the phasedown of lead gasoline.
Final Lead RIA E12 (cited in note 25).
41. The shift to unleaded gas over the last five years has largely occurred as a result of the EPA
phasedown regulation. But in the early 1980s, a significant portion of the auto fleet was using leaded
gas, even though-according to EPA's analysis-they would have been better off using unleaded gas.
Id at 14, 18. There are two possible explanations: (1) consumers were poorly informed or (2) EPA's
estimates of the benefits of using unleaded gas were too high.
42. Final Asbestos RIA, Part V (cited in note 35).
43. Id at Part VII.
44. See B. T. Mossman, et al, Asbestos: Scientific Developments and Implications for Public Policy,
Science 247, 294-301 (Jan 19, 1990). There were alternative estimates of potency available to EPA.
Arguably, EPA chose conservative estimates to be cautious. But these upper-bound risk estimates
were presented, without qualification, as representing the risk associated with asbestos use. Final
Asbestos RIA, Part V and App D, Risk Models (cited in note 35).
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categories where the estimated health risks of continued use appear to be
small and the opportunity costs of banning use appear to be substantial. 4 5
This is particularly the case, for example, with EPA's ban/phasedown of
asbestos use in asbestos cement pipe.
V
CONCLUSION

The requirement that EPA carry out a comprehensive analysis of its major
regulatory proposals is controversial. Critics object to using "net social
benefits" as the criterion for regulatory decisionmaking. Some even argue
against the adoption of an analytical framework to assess of the tradeoffs that
46
arise in setting environmental policy.
An essential task of government, however, is to ask how and to what extent
regulatory intervention will enhance the public welfare. Environmental
regulation redirects substantial private resources for public purposes. It is the
responsibility of government to assure that such intervention will achieve its
objectives as efficiently and effectively as possible. Both economic analysis
and benefit/cost analysis are vital to this process; they identify alternative
approaches and provide decisionmakers with insight into the likely effects of
these alternatives.
The better RIAs, as illustrated by the two case studies discussed above, can
make a major contribution to the decisionmaking process. In these two
examples, the RIAs led to changes in policy yielding substantial net social
benefits. A number of EPA's RIAs, though, have not provided the analysis
required by Executive Order 12291. The most common problems with these
RIAs are that they fail to consider suitable alternatives to the selected
regulatory action, and they fail to quantify benefits. This is a problem,
unfortunately, that is shared with other federal agencies.
Because of the unevenness in the quality of the RIAs produced by all
federal agencies-not just EPA-OMB published guidelines for developing
RIAs as a part of the 1990-91 Regulatory Program. 4 7 The new OMB
guidelines and OMB efforts under Executive Order 12291 will not be
sufficient, however, to improve federal agency analysis of proposed regulatory
actions. These measures will need to be supplemented by institutional
changes within the agencies so that decisionmakers are provided with the
analysis required to make effective and efficient regulatory decisions.

45. 40 CFR § 763 (1990).
46. See Steve Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 Regulation 33-40 (Jan/Feb
1981).
47. Regulatory Program of the United States Government, April 1, 1990-March 31, 1991, App
V at 653 (OMB).

